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Comment on Professor Jordan's Paper 
In these remarks I would like to elaborate what I understand to be 
the thrust of Professor Jordan 's paper, and to introduce and relate 
to his work a notion of lived experience, whi ch is suggested to me by 
his material throug hout. Professor Jordan claims that the phenomena 
investigated by the mora l sciences imply fields of meaning quite dif· 
ferent from the meaning fou nd in material objects of mere sense per-
ception. Thus there is in fact a divergence of foclIs in the methods 
and the su bj ect matter of the mora l and natural sciences. The moral 
sciences com prehend the su bjective, conscious dimension of thoughts. 
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"(lions, and values by means of which the artifacts arc prod uced . The 
attempt \0 understand this in terior dimension of human ex istence and 
culture, at least since Diilhey, has lin ked the moral sciences with 
descriptive psychology. Thi s attempt has also rein forced the claim 01 
the moral sciences \0 an autonomous method. Professor Jordan also 
discusses the idea of a phenomenological mora l science by out lining 
Alfred SchULZ's cri tique of r-.Iax Weber, and by asking how it is pos-
sible to understand the data of the moral sciences by an interpretation 
of the aClions through which the data have been produced. J shall 
also speak briefl y abollt his reference to a ll eidetic psychology. 
II was pointed out that "Veber's aim in moral science explanation 
was tile attempt to discover, understand, and typify lin agent's motives 
for action. But Schutz has claimed thal Weber confused the following 
two aspects of motive-action expla nation as if they were one: (A) T he 
subjective meaning, or t.he meani ng o f tile action as the agent under-
sta nds it ; and (B) the subjective meani ng of the action as it is inter-
preted by the moral scientist. \ Veller's assumption that A and Bare 
identical is auended by his belief ( I) that A is actually observable 
and (2) that A is interpreted from the context of meaning su pplied 
by the moral scientist himseH. The implicat ion here is that an "ob· 
jective'· and imposed meaning is given to the agent fro m the outset. 
Apparently the issue here is tha t lhe agent's subjective intention is 
not observed in its originary status, but is merely indicated. I believe 
that we can best understand this subjecti ve intention and its place in 
moral science by relating it to what has been called by Dilthey ",he 
li ved experience" (Erlebcns). This is that conscious st ate which is 
immedi;ltely lived through by the human subject and, as such, is 
epistemologically prior to an idealized or "objective" interpretation 
such as that di scussed under B above. Complementing the lived ex-
perience is another conce pt which has come to be call ed the life world 
(Lelumswell). I am convinced, incidentall y, that both of these ideas 
were intuited by Vico in their modern sense. By the term "life ,,>,orld" 
[ sha ll mean the world in which we actua lly live, the world intended 
by cveryday awareness as the pr imary province of reality as it is actu-
ally lived. Qur immediate consciousness of this world is the lived ex· 
perience-that is, Ollr awareness unmediated by presuppositions, con· 
structive hypotheses, or arbitrary selectivity. Such experience is im-
mediate in that the sta tus of its content involves nothing more than its 
being lived. As such, a lived experience is und crsta ndable by another 
only potentially, by derivation, or by interpretation of human cultural 
expressions. 
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I believe that the above sit uation is what Sch utz rders to in his claim 
that ·Weber mistakes the li ved experience of the moral scient ist's inter· 
preta tion process for the lived experience of the agent to be under. 
stood. But we lUust note here that while it is inevitable that we cannot 
possess the identical lived experience of another, it does not fo llow 
that the mora l scientist can not, in pri nciple, experience a content 
whi ch has the same meaning as that of the agelll's. The possibility 
of such a relivi ng of another's meaning is a necessary condition for 
culture. For without a meaningful relivi ng of another's ex perience, 
intersubjecli vity of understa nding would not exist. Schu tz seems to 
recognize this fact when he tell s us that "being with another" (M il.win) 
is a primordial gi ven in the human condition-tha t is, one of the ex· 
istentials without which man would not be man. \Ve might well a.d· 
if the explanatory role of eidet ic psychology is anything but a reifica· 
tion and clarification of this fact. 
At thi s point Vico's thought is releva nt. One reasoll that the moral 
sciences have an explanatory priority is that the vertllll est fue/lI11! 
formula establishes the very possibilit y of intersubjectivity. The cui· 
ture and meaning "made" or constituted by the individ ual occms in 
the lived experi ence. \Vhen the hu man bei ng deliberately performs 
the subjective, symbolic operations that constitute a mea ning, then it 
is possible for another to "do the same thi ng." 'Vhen anot her "docs 
the sa me thing,"' then he can self-consciously refer lO his own states 01 
immediate awareness-that is, a like meaning is potentia lly lived in 
each because a sim ilarl y constituted meaning is created by the like 
action or experience o ( each. For example, (or two children to under· 
stand the mea ning of mastering a bicycle there is entailed a bei ng able 
to "do the same thi ng." The doing 01" making of a like thing provides 
a basis for a simi lar li ved experience. 
When professor J orda n refers to the eidetic psychology, I take it that 
this is a contemporary response to Vi co's charge that the moral sci· 
ellces must determine the "mod ifi cations of mental life." T his psy· 
cho logy after H usserl's program would try to determi ne in an exact 
and generally valid lUanner what the universal structures (citloi) of 
these mod ificat ions are. It would ask, for exa mple, how such en tities 
as motives, values, mea nings, and volitions are actually consti tuted in 
the li ved experien ce of man . Such an eidetic science would help in· 
sure that we do not mistake, as vVeber apparently d id, origi nary, lived 
states of experience in an agent for explanatory sl ates of experience in 
the moral scientist. In other words, it attempts to determi ne Vico's 
modifications o f mental life, or those universal constituents which 
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make given experiences what they arc ami not someth ing else. \Ve 
may notc, fina lly. that the need for sllch eidetic and originary science 
was first conceived by Vic:o during the lone vigil of his genius. 
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